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A NEW LOOK AT MUNICIPAL BONDS
DISCLOSURE RESPONSIBILITIES IN
THE MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET
WILLIAM J. CASEY*
OWEN T. SMITH**
A variety of forces have recently emerged and combined to
generate new responsibilities and as yet unanswered questions for
issuers, underwriters, dealers, and attorneys involved in the munic-
ipal bond market.' These forces include a rate of increase in the
cost of local and state governments exceeding the rate of increase
of both the federal budget 2 and inflation,3 tax and rent control
* President, Export-Import Bank of the United States, 1974-1976; Under Secretary of
State for Economic Affairs, 1973-1974; Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission,
1971-1973; B.S. 1934, LL.D. 1976, Fordham University; J.D. 1937, LL.D. 1971, St. John's
University.
** Chairman, Nassau County Planning Commission, 1976; B.A., Trinity College, 1959;
J.D., St. John's University, 1964.
Municipal securities are debt instruments issued by state and local governmental units
to raise capital to fulfill their various obligations. Generally, they may be divided into four
categories:
(1) General Obligation Bonds - Payment of these bonds is secured by the issuer's
legal pledge to meet the obligation by means of its full faith and credit to the extent
of its taxing power. In some jurisdictions general obligation bonds require voter
approval.
(2) Revenue Bonds -Payment of these bonds is secured only by the revenues
derived from the specific municipal project financed by the bond issue.
(3) Special Obligation Bonds - Principal and interest payments are met by means
of special taxation or other specific types of income of the municipal issuer (e.g.,
highway bonds payable from gasoline tax).
(4) Industrial Development Bonds -An industrial facility is constructed with the
capital provided by the bond issue and is subsequently leased to a private concern.
The bond is then paid by means of the rent charged.
For discussions of the operation of the municipal bond market, see S. REP. No. 94-75, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 38-45 (1975) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.]; L. MOAK, ADMINISTRATION OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 49-52, 335-39 (1970); Note, Municipal Bonds and the Federal
Securities Laws: The Results of Forty Years of Indirect Regulation, 28 VAND. L. REv. 561, 562-75
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Municipal Bonds].
2 During the period from 1950 to 1975 the federal budget increased at the rate of 8.5%
per year while the combined state and local expenditures have increased at the rate of 8.8%
per year. State expenditures were up 8.6% per year; local government expenditures were up
8.9% per year. See sources cited note 3 infra.
3 Inflation increased at the average annual rate of 4.4% during the period 1950 to 1975.
In the same period state and local expenditures increased at a rate far outstripping the
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policies that have eroded the tax base in many localities, 4 borrow-
ing to meet rising operating costs, 5 and resort to questionable
accounting practices and financial gimmickry. 6 Even before the
publicity surrounding the New York City fiscal crisis, these under-
lying forces had been eroding the fiscal stability of local govern-
ments while public confidence in municipal securities had been
steadily deteriorating.
In the first weeks of 1972, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission received reports that the "boiler room" and "cold call"
selling methods of the 1930's were being revived in the municipal
bond market in Memphis, Tennessee. After an intensive 9-month
staff investigation, the Commission, on October 26, 1972, instituted
civil proceedings against certain dealers for fraudulent practices,
including misrepresentations, interpositioning, and excessive mark-
ups on sales and markdowns on purchases.7
During the same year, officials of the City and State of New
York complained that the reduction in the rating given New York
inflation rate. The 1950 to 1975 rate of increase of state and local expenditures was 8.8% per
year or double the inflationary rate of increase. As a percent of Gross National Product, state
and 'local governmental expenditures have also increased dramatically. In 1950, state and
local governmental expenditures were 9.8% of G.N.P. By 1975 these expenditures had risen
to 15.3% of G.N.P. or an increase of 56% in the ratio of state and local expenditures to
G.N.P. See THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1977, at 368;
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Series GF75 No. 5, GOVERNMENTAL
FINANCES IN 1974-75, at 21 (1976); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Series
GF75 No. 3, STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1975, at 29 (1976); U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1975, at 250;
62 FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN, July 1976, at A54.
4 See R. PETrENGILL &J. UPPAL, CAN CITIES SURVIVE? (1974). The authors maintain that
the general property tax is the most likely area to provide an increase in revenues. Id. at
37-39. Rent control policies, however, make it extremely difficult for landlords to shift part
of the burden to their tenants. Id. at 100. As a result, property tax increases have lagged
behind increases in other taxes. Id. at 36-37. Compounding the problem is the fact that cities
have become "havens of the poor," providing services which cannot be supported by their
small tax bases. Id. at 9, 16-17; see N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1976, at 1, col. 4.
'See R. PETTENGILL & J. UPPAL, CAN CITIES SURVIVE? 145-47 (1974).
' Recent audits conducted in New York City have exposed such practices as overstating
federal and state aid, entering charges before receiving payments, and omitting uncollected
taxes from the total tax entry. It was estimated that the resulting deficits would cost the City
more than $5.5 billion over the next 15 years. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1975, at 1, col. 7; see Note,
Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities, 60 MINN. L. REV. 567, 589 (1976).
"See 168 N.Y.L.J. 81, Oct. 27, 1972, at 1, col. 3. In SEC v. Investors Associates of
America, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,644 (W.D. Tenn. 1972)
(summary of complaint), and SEC v. Charles A. Morris & Associates, 386 F. Supp. 1327
(W.D. Tenn. 1973), noted in Municipal Bonds, supra note 1, at 595-97, the defendants were
charged with employing high pressure, boiler room techniques to sell securities. The Morris
court found that defendants had violated the federal antifraud provisions and granted an
injunction and disgorgement. The defendants' improper activity included: "cold calls" to
prospective purchasers whose names were obtained from telephone books; the mailing of
sales confirmations to customers who had not agreed to purchase securities; the use of
untrained and unsupervised salesmen; and pressing customers into making quick investment
decisions on the basis of misrepresentations and omissions of material facts.
A NEW LOOK AT MUNICIPAL BONDS
City and State bonds by Moody's Investors Service and Standard
and Poor, the principal bond rating agencies, had increased the
borrowing costs of those governmental units.' A hearing on munic-
ipal bonds was called by Congressmen Murphy and Podell of the
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee to consider
the extent to which the Federal Government should intervene to
regulate rating agencies and other participants in the municipal
securities market.9 Officials of Moody's and Standard and Poor
patiently explained why they had taken this action with respect to
the city and state bonds. In addition, the Chairman of the SEC
commented upon broker-dealer abuses in the municipal bond
market and stated: "[T]he time has come to require municipal
bond dealers to register, to keep books and records and to meet the
same kind of standards in selling practices and price mark-ups that
registered dealers in other securities are required to meet."'10 Thus,
at this hearing, a week before the national elections of 1972, early
signs of New York City's financial difficulties were visible, a call for
federal intervention was sounded, and a first step in bringing
municipal bond broker-dealers under SEC regulation was taken.
Today, the troubled financial condition of New York City
particularly" and urban areas generally, 2 the regulation of munic-
ipal bond broker-dealers under the 1975 amendments to the Ex-
change Act, 13 and the ever-increasing potential of liability under
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws have caused
underwriters to insist on expanded disclosure by local governments
8 See 168 N.Y.L.J. 81, Oct. 27, 1972, at 1, col. 3.9Id.lO Id.
II For a discussion of New York City's problems, see Congressional Budget Office, N.ew
York City's Fiscal Problem: Its Origin, Potential Repercussions, and Some Alternative Policy
Responses (Oct. 10, 1975).
12 For a discussion of urban fiscal difficulties, see R. PETTENGILL &J. UPPAL, CAN CITIES
SURVIVE? (1974).
13 Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, §§ 3(3), 3(6), 11, 13, 89 Stat.
97, 101-02, 121-27, 131-37,amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c, 78o (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§
78c(a)(12), (29), (30), (31), (32), (33), 78o(b), (c), 78o-4 (Supp. 1976)). These amendments
limit the municipal securities exemption of the Exchange Act and subject brokers and
dealers, including banks, that deal in municipal securities to SEC registration and regulation.
In addition, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board was created to act as a self-
regulatory body overseeing the municipal securities industry. The Board has the authority to
adopt rules designed to set standards of training and competence in the industry, 15
U.S.C.A. § 78o-4(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1976), provide for periodic examination, id. §§ 78o-
4(b)(2)(A)(i), (E), prevent and define manipulative acts and practices, id. § 78o-4(b)(2)(c),
establish arbitration procedures, id. § 78o-4(b)(2)(D), regulate the form and content of price
quotations, id. § 78o-4(b)(2)(F), and prescribe required records of municipal securities brok-
ers and dealers, id. § 78o-4(b)(2)(G). All rules adopted by the Board are subject to review and
amendment by the SEC. Id. § 78s(c); see S. REP., supra note 1, at 48. Enforcement of the
Board's rules is the responsibility of the SEC and other existing regulatory agencies. See id. at
47.
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seeking to market their bonds. This Article will discuss these
emerging disclosure requirements, focusing on the problems which
have engendered them, the difficulty in resolving these problems
through increased disclosure, and legislative attempts to define the
disclosure obligations of the participants in a municipal securities
offering.
DISCLOSURE
Until recently there has been little or no disclosure by state and
local governments in connection with the sale of their securities. 14
Unlike the mandatory and highly detailed financial statements
which accompany the issuance of securities by a private corpora-
tion, 15 the typical state or local disclosure document consisted of a
'4 Due to the exemption of municipal securities from the disclosure provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970), state and local governments are not
required by federal law to prepare or provide disclosure documents when they issue securi-
ties. Congress provided this exemption for several reasons:
(a) The significant abuses demonstrated in the sale of corporate securities were not
duplicated in the sale of municipal securities. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(1933).
(b) The purchasers of municipal securities were highly sophisticated investors. See
Hearings on S. 873 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 232
(1933).
(c) Possible constitutional problems were anticipated. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 14 (1933).
(d) One of the draftsmen of the Act suggested that "obvious political reasons" contrib-
uted to the exemption. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 29, 39 (1959).
(e) Regulation would have impaired the marketability of municipal bonds and the
ability of municipalities to borrow funds needed for municipal affairs. See generally Hearings
on H.R. 7852 & H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 755 (1934).
The vast majority of states also exempt municipal securities from their registration
requirements. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 37(a) (Cum. Supp. 1973); ALASKA STAT. §
45.55.140 (a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7309(a)(1) (1974); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 110A, § 402(a)(1) (Supp. 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-1202(a) (Supp.
1976). Some modification of this exemption, though rare, does occur. See, e.g., IowA CODE
ANN. § 502.202(1) (Supp. 1976) (exemption does not include certain revenue obligations);
NEV. REv. STAT. § 90.140 (1973) (no exemption for municipal securities); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 1707.02(B) (Page Supp. 1975) (exemption only for municipal securities payable out
of general tax proceeds). The Uniform Securities Act, which has been adopted by 30 states,
the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, exempts municipal securities from all but its
antifraud provisions. See UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 402(a); id., commissioners' note.
As a result of these exemptions, publication of information with respect to a municipal
issuer has been on a voluntary basis and determined by the issuer itself. This information, at
least with respect to general obligation bonds, has been limited to a general description of
the municipality. See Municipal Bonds, supra note 1, at 571. Nonetheless, the possibility that
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws may now actually be enforced against
municipal issuers, see note 76 infra, could stimulate disclosure of information which Congress
and the courts have deemed material irrespective of the issuer's preferences.
15 Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970), provides that no
security can be sold unless it is accompanied by a registration statement. The contents of the
registration statement and the exhibits and other materials which must be filed have been
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short description of the securities being sold, excerpts from the
applicable statute, and a cover sheet.' 6 Some municipalities, cer-
tainly a minority, also issued abbreviated financial statements, most
of which were unaudited and outdated. 17 Due to a number of
intertwined market, regulatory, and economic factors, munici-
palities are now being compelled to go beyond this limited disclo-
sure and provide investors with detailed and expanding disclosure
documents.
The still unresolved New York City fiscal crisis has not only
illustrated the real possibility of a default on municipal bonds, but
has also focused attention upon the possibly precarious financial
situations of other cities.' As a result, investors who would nor-
mally blindly rely on the security of a municipality are now ques-
tioning the ability of local governmental issuers to meet their obli-
gations. 19 Moreover, investors have become particularly concerned
extensively prescribed by the SEC. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.400-.494 (1976). The basic goal
sought to be achieved by requiring the filing of the registration statement is to provide the
public with adequate information upon which to base an investment decision. See, e.g., United
States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir.), cert. denkd, 389 U.S. 850
(1967); SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 106, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd, 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970). Consequently, the disclosure requirements have been
interpreted broadly to effect this remedial goal. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S.
119, 124-27 (1953). For a general discussion of the registration statement, its purposes, and
its effects, see Schneider & Manko, Going Public -Practice, Procedure and Consequences, 15
VILL. L. Rv. 283, 290-300 (1970).
1" For a discussion of a study of the disclosure practices of 174 local governments during
1974, see Hearings on S. 2969 & S. 2574 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of tle Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 251-53, 259-68 (1976).
1'7 Few governmental entities are required to provide annual or other regular financial
statements prepared by independent certified public accountants. In contradistinction, au-
dited financial statements are necessary for all private corporations whose securities are
offered to the public. This disparity in published financial information has been justified by
the assertion that an audit of the records of an institution like the City of New York would
prove to be an impossible task. Nevertheless, by virtue of the New York State Municipal
Assistance Corporation Act, the legislation creating "Big Mac," the City of New York must
institute audit procedures. See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 3038 (McKinney Supp. Pamphlet
1970-1975).
18 Indicative of the troubled financial condition of cities other than New York are the
widely publicized layoffs of municipal employees in several large urban areas. See, e.g.,
BusINEss WEEK, July 21, 1975, at 51 (Detroit and Cleveland); id., Sept. 1, 1975, at 51 (Detroit
and Philadelphia). Such problems have been discussed in a recent spate of commentaries
dealing with the fiscal difficulties of American cities. See, e.g., R. PET-rENGILL & J. UPPAL, CAN
CrrEs SuRvIVE? (1974); BusiNEss WEEK, Aug. 11, 1975, at 46; N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1975, at
1, col. 8. Cities are now encountering greater investor hesitancy when they attempt to enter
the municipal securities market. This problem is illustrated by the recent experience of
Murfreesboro, Tennessee. In October 1975, a few months after the New York City crisis was
first publicized, Murfreesboro borrowed $3.8 million for the construction of improved city
facilities. The city found that because of the public's fear of purchasing municipal bonds, the
city had lost an average of at least one-half of a percentage point in interest costs, an annual
expense of approximately $20,000. Id., Oct. 19, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
11 In past years, investors did not question the security of municipal bonds, which were
considered, along with obligations of the United States, as among the most secure invest-
ments available. Traditionally, trusts and various pension funds relied blindly on municipal
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about the possibility of legislation that permits municipalities to
defer payments and use tax revenues to meet other obligations.20
securities because of their apparent security. Indeed, a recent study by Professor Ronald
Forbes at the State University of New York at Albany indicates that only 39% of the major
institutional investors in municipal securities employed a full-time analyst to review munici-
pal securities. See Hearings on S.2969 & S.2574 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 253 (1976). Even in the event a
security was questioned, that questioning was limited to an evaluation of the information
obtained from the standard rating services. See Note, Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities,
60 MINN. L. Rav. 567, 584-85 (1976).
The situation is entirely different today. Again using the plight of New York City as an
example, a study of the results of the sale of Municipal Assistance Corporation bonds
demonstrates that investors across the country are extremely hesitant to buy anything
connected with New York City. BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 4, 1975, at 57; id., Aug. 11, 1975, at
46; id., Sept. 8, 1975, at 58. As a direct result of New York's fiscal problems, other major
cities throughout the United States have experienced similar problems in marketing their
bonds. A recent report in the New York Times lists East Millinscket, Maryland, San Antonio,
Texas, Salem, Oregon, and Murfreesboro, Tennessee among the cities which have experi-
enced difficulties similar to those encountered by New York. It has been estimated that the
reevaluation of municipal credit precipitated by New York's problems has added $3 billion a
year to the interest costs of governmental units across the nation. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1975,
at 1, col. 6, at 48, col. 5.
20 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1976, at 1, col. 4. As a result of the severe crisis encountered
by New York City, the state legislature enacted the New York State Emergency Moratorium
Act for the City of New York, chs. 874-75 [1975] N.Y. Laws 1484-88 (McKinney Special
Pamphlet) (EMA), to allow the city to regain its financial health and maintain its essential
services. See id. § 1. The EMA prohibits the collection of sums due on outstanding city short
term obligations until 3 years after the effective date if an offer has been made to exchange
these obligations for long term notes. It also provides that upon refusal of the offer, interest
is to be paid at the stated rate until maturity and thereafter at a minimum of 6% a year. The
constitutionality of the EMA was recently upheld in Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal
Assistance Corp., 52 App. Div. 2d 84, 382 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1st Dep't 1976), appeal docketed, No.
39 (N.Y. Ct. App. May 13, 1976). The court, in reaching its conclusion that the Act "is not a
'... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts,'" 52 App. Div. 2d at 87, 382 N.Y.S.2d at
766, quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, emphasized the grave financial emergency facing New
York City, the inherent power of the State to modify remedial processes and protect the
public interest, and the legislative intent to simply delay payment of, rather than to dishonor,
the short term obligations of the city. 52 App. Div. 2d at 87-89, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 766-67,
citing, inter alia, Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942); Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). In addition to rejecting the contract
clause objection, the court also quickly disposed of challenges based on asserted violations of
both the constitution and general laws of the State. The EMA has also been challenged and
upheld in federal court. Ropico, Inc. v. City of New York, Civil No. 75-6168 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
7, 1976) (rejecting arguments based on due process, equal protection, contract clause, access
to the courts, full faith and credit, and the Bankruptcy Act).
The municipal bankruptcy reforms adopted by Congress in 1976 were also stimulated
by the New York City situation, although they have wide applicability throughout the
country. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 401 et seq. (Supp. 2, 1976); H.R. REP. No. 686, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 (1975). These reforms are an attempt by the Government to provide some remedies
upon municipal default or bankruptcy, and are thus of great interest to potential investors.
Essentially, the new provisions establish a procedure under which a municipality in financial
difficulty may file a petition in the federal district court without first obtaining the consent of
its creditors. This eliminates the extensive prepetition negotiations previously required and
operates as an automatic stay of all actions. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 405(e)(1) (Supp. 2, 1976). The
amendments also provide for joinder of the state, the SEC, and all known or unknown
creditors, so that cooperation of all parties may be achieved. See id. § 405(d); H.R. REP. No.
686, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-6 (1975). In addition, the amendments accord the bankruptcy
court certain new powers. Most important of these is the power to authorize the petitioner to
issue certificates of indebtedness having such priority and security as is determined by the
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This loss of investor confidence has undermined the ability of local
governments to obtain bids, causing an increase in interest rates
and, in extreme cases, a complete refusal to bid.21 Consequently,
investors' demands for greater disclosure take on biting signifi-
cance for any governmental unit which desires to issue marketable
bonds.22
Compounding the pressures exerted by the loss of investor
confidence, the recent imposition of greater investigative and dis-
closure obligations upon underwriters has forced underwriters to
protect themselves by demanding the required information from
the issuer under pain of not handling the issuer's paper. Both the
SEC and the courts have emphasized the special relationship and
the concomitant greater obligations which an underwriter assumes
when he underwrites a corporate issue.23 Since the underwriter
court. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 402(b)(2) (Supp. 2, 1976). These certificates would allow the
municipality to once again enter the credit market by assuring potential lenders both security
and priority over existing obligations. The use of these certificates will usually be essential to
the reconstitution of a bankrupt municipality into a financially viable entity. See H.R. REP.
No. 686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975). At the conclusion of negotiations between the
municipality and its creditors, the agreement reached is filed with the court for approval.
The court then considers the plan, and if the "creditors holding at least two-thirds" of the
claims notify the court that they find the plan agreeable, the court may approve it. 11
U.S.C.A. § 412(b) (Supp. 2, 1976). After confirmation, the court supervises the municipality's
operations to ensure that the terms of the plan are complied with. Id. § 416(c).
21 See BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 11, 1975, at 46. Most municipal securities are sold by public
bid. Under this procedure, a municipality first announces that it is seeking to sell securities.
Afterwards, an offering statement and details of the terms of sale are made available.
Traditionally, underwriters flocked to such offerings. Due to the loss of investor confidence
resulting from the New York City fiscal crisis, however, underwriters are no longer actively
seeking these offerings. This has resulted in increased interest rates and debt service charges
for many municipalities. See note 19 supra; Note, Federal Regulation of Municipal Securities, 60
MINN. L. REv. 567, 588 (1976); N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
22 The market is demanding information concerning the revenue sources from which
the bonds will be repaid and the limitations, both legal and practical, on increasing these
levies. It wants to know about population movement and growth or decline of the business
base on which this income depends. It wants to know where and how costs are increasing
and what capital and funding requirements lie ahead, with particular focus on pension
obligations and, in suburban communities, the impact of sewer assessments. It wants an
accurate gauge of the extent to which current operating costs are paid by short term
borrowing, capital financing on long term bond issues, and/or federal, state, or county
grants. Dependence on grants, in turn, requires an assessment of the ability of these higher
governmental units to continue their largess. Additionally, with respect to the sale of
revenue bonds, the market wants reliable information to establish the ability of the facility to
generate sufficient income to meet its expenses and pay the obligations under the bond.
Since it is possible that liability under the federal securities laws may be imposed on a
municipality and its officers, see note 76 infra, and since the marketability of a municipality's
bonds is largely dependent upon the extent of its disclosure, it has become advisable for a
municipal issuer to provide this information together with any known or ascertainable data
material to a calculation of its outstanding and anticipated debt.
23 Section 1 (a)(5) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5) (1970), which does
not apply to municipal bond transactions, subjects an underwriter to civil liability for
damages resulting from depreciation in value of a security due to inclusion in the registra-
tion statement of an untrue material fact or the omission of a material fact necessary to make
the statement not misleading. To escape liability under this section, the underwriter must
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occupies the unique position of being able to obtain unpublished
information from the issuer, it has been held, under section 11 (e)
of the Securities Act, that in order for an underwriter to establish a
"due diligence" defense he must conduct a thorough investigation
aimed at uncovering material misstatements and omissions in the
issuer's registration statement.24 It is insufficient for the underwrit-
er to simply accept the predictions and statements of officers and
directors of the corporation. As further support for the imposition
of these greater obligations, the courts have focused upon the
prove that "he had, after reasonable investigation[,] reasonable ground to believe and did
believe . .." that the nonexpert sections of the registration statement were true and
complete. Id. § 77k(b)(3)(A). Interpreting the extent of the investigatory efforts necessary to
successfully assert this "due diligence" defense, courts have carefully scrutinized the efforts
of underwriters since they should assume an adversarial relationship with corporate man-
agement and pursue an independent investigation of the issuer. See Feit v. Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 580-82 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris
Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Comment, BarChris: Due Diligence
Refined, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1411, 1420-23 (1968). Indeed, the SEC has made its position
clear: an underwriter's expertise, intermediary function, adversarial position, and public
trust require, at the very least, an independent verification of the information submitted to it
and, in some cases, a thorough and intensive investigation. See SEC Securities Act Release
No. 33-5275 (July 26, 1972), reprinted in 1 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 4506 B. Similarly, in
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
910 (1973), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, analogizing to both § 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, rule 10b-5, and § 11 of the Securities Act, held that an underwriter must,
under § 14(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970), independently evaluate the
registration statement, and, where there is a strong suggestion of deception, it must conduct
"a reasonable further investigation." 480 F.2d at 371. The court premised this duty upon the
critical position occupied by the underwriter in the securities marketing scheme. As the court
noted: "No greater reliance in our self-regulatory system is placed on any single participant
in the issuance of securities than upon the underwriter." Id. at 370. The status of this
decision is in some doubt due to the grant of certiorari in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
96 S. Ct. 1505 (1976).
The imposition of greater investigative duties upon underwriters is in accordance with
the congressional recognition that varying degrees of responsibility should attach to the
different functions in the marketing scheme. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9
(1933). For a discussion of the inequity of imposing greater investigative duties on municipal
securities underwriters while exempting the issuer of these securities from disclosure obliga-
tions, see note 38 and text accompanying note 59 infra.
24 See, e.g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) (Weinstein, J.); cases discussed in note 23 supra. In Feit, the court found that the
issuer's registration statement was materially misleading. After discussing the degree of
investigation required into the accuracy of the registration statement by an inside director,
Judge Weinstein observed that "[s]ection 11 holds underwriters to the same burden of
establishing reasonable investigation and reasonable ground to believe the accuracy of the
registration statement." 332 F. Supp. at 581. The court did recognize, however, that under-
writers do not possess the same intimate knowledge of corporate affairs as do officers and
directors, and defined the investigative responsibilities of underwriters in light of these
considerations. Nonetheless, Judge Weinstein held that underwriters "are expected to exer-
cise a high degree of care in investigation and independent verification of the company's
representations." Id. at 582, citing, inter alia, Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp.
643, 696-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Comment, BarChris: Due Diligence Refined, 68 COLUNi. L. REV.
1411, 1417 (1968). The court therefore concluded that the underwriters in Feit had 'just
barely established" their due diligence defense since they had conducted a reasonable
investigation and had reasonably verified representations made by the issuer. 332 F. Supp. at
583.
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reliance by investors on an underwriter's association with a particu-
lar issue.25 Of course, an underwriter of municipal bonds is not
subject to section 11(e) of the Securities Act since a registration
statement need not be filed by a local or state government.2 6 Never-
theless, recognition of the underwriter's increased opportunity for
verification and the investor's reliance upon an underwriter's as-
sociation with an issue may lead other courts to conclude that an
underwriter in a securities offering should be held to a higher
standard of conduct than other participants under section 17(a) of
the Securities Act,27 section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 28 and rule
lOb-5, 29 all of which do apply to municipal securities.30
Accordingly, the recent Supreme Court ruling in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder31 - that scienter is necessary to maintain a private
25 See cases cited in note 23 supra. Discussing the unique status of an underwriter with
respect to the distribution of securities, the SEC has noted the underwriter's central role as
an intermediary between the issuer and the investing public. The public looks to the
underwriter for protection and expects the underwriter to verify the accuracy of the
registration statement. See Richmond Corp., 41 S.E.C. 398, 406 (1963); SEC Securities Act
Release No. 33-5275 (July 26, 1972), reprinted in 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 4506 B. See also
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933).26See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970); note 14 supra.
27 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
28 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
29 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
"0 In Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (Kaufman, J.), an action was
brought for rescission and damages by the purchasers of certain bonds of the Bellevue
Bridge Commission (Nebraska) against several defendants, including the underwriters. The
plaintiffs alleged that they purchased the municipal bonds "in reliance upon false and
misleading matter in an offering circular" and other documents that violated § 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and rule lob-5. On
defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court held, in substance, that
despite the municipal bond exemption from liabilities for material misrepresentations in a
prospectus or oral communication under § 12(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(l)(2)
(1970), §§ 17(a) and 10(b) are still applicable since § 12(2) sets a negligence standard for
liability and shifts the burden of proof to the deferldant, whereas § 10(b) and § 17(a)
apparently require the plaintiff to allege and prove knoiving or intentional material misrep-
resentations. 131 F. Supp. at 419-20. In other cases involving claims similar to those
presented in Thiele, the courts have reached a like result. See Greenwich Savings Bank v.
Shields, 131 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (§ 17(a) and § 10(b) claims upheld); Connecticut
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (§ 10(b) claim upheld,
§ 17(a) claim not ruled on); Baron v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (§ 10(b)
claim upheld, § 17(a) claim not discussed). See also Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne,
307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962) (§§ 17(a), 10(b), and rule lOb-5 applied to municipal bond
transaction); Shapiro v. Schwamm, 279 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (§ 10(b) claim substi-
tuted for claim under § 12(2) of the Securities Act to avoid statute of limitations in municipal
securities suit). For a discussion of the law in this area, see Doty, Application of the Antifraud
Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws to Exempt Offerings: Duties of Underriters and Counsel, 16
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 393, 400-16 (1975); Rosenzweig, Municipal Securities and the
Anti fraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 4 SEC. REG. L.J. 135, 142-50 (1976).
31 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976). Ernst involved an action brought by customers of First Securi-
ties Co. The president of First Securities had induced these customers to invest funds in
escrow accounts which were promised to yield a high rate of return. After investing continu-
ally in the escrow accounts from 1942 through 1966, the customers learned in 1968 that the
accounts did not exist. The customers commenced an action against First Securities' account-
1976]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:639
action for damages under rule 1Ob-5- may not afford as much
protection for underwriters as first appears. Significantly, the de-
fendant in Ernst was an accounting firm whose identity was un-
known to the plaintiff and whose audits of First Securities, a small
brokerage firm, were not relied upon by the plaintiffs at the time
they invested in a fraudulent securities scheme perpetrated by the
president of First Securities. Moreover, although the Court defined
scienter as including intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud, it
declined to rule on "the question whether, in some circumstances,
reckless behaviour is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and
Rule 1Ob-5. ' '32 Given an underwriter's special characteristics, im-
ing firm, Ernst & Ernst, alleging that Ernst & Ernst had failed to conduct a proper audit and
that employment of proper auditing procedures would have resulted in discovery of the
fraud. In effect, the plaintiff argued that Ernst & Ernst had "aided and abetted" a
fraudulent scheme, thus violating § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b) (1970), and rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
The Court rejected plaintiff's negligence theory of rule 1Ob-5 liability and reached the
conclusion that scienter is a requisite element of a private civil action under § 10(b) and rule
lOb-5. Construing the words of the statute and the legislative history underlying the Ex-
change Act, the Court found Congress' use of the words "any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance" in § 10(b) particularly significant in that the combination of the words
"manipulative or deceptive" with "device or contrivance" "strongly suggest that.., knowing
or intentional misconduct" was intended to be proscribed. 96 S. Ct. at 1383. Moreover, the
Court found that although the legislative history does not bear directly on the question of
whether scienter is an element of a § 10(b) action, the legislative history which did exist
tended to support the conclusion that scienter is required. Id. at 1385-89.
Prior to the decision in Ernst, it was established in the Second Circuit that scienter was
required for civil liability under rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1301-02 (2d Cir.
1973) (en banc) (dicta). In SEC enforcement actions, however, that court requires only a
finding of negligence. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973). Since
the Supreme Court in Ernst specifically reserved the question whether scienter is required in
an enforcement action, 96 S. Ct. at 1381 n.12, it is possible that the Supreme Court, like the
Second Circuit, will distinguish between the culpability required in enforcement actions and
private civil actions. Judge Friendly, in his concurring opinion in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 866-69 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969),justified just such
a reading of different standards in the same statutory language. Significantly, Judge
Friendly noted that the Supreme Court has recognized that the elements of fraud vary
"'with the nature of the relief sought' and that '[i]t is not necessary in a suit for equitable or
prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for money damages.'" 401
F.2d at 868, quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963).
He further reasoned that a negligence standard in an enforcement action is proper since one
of the purposes of the securities laws is to prevent the circulation of improper information.
Judge Friendly also observed that the imposition of a negligence standard in civil suits would
discourage optional disclosure of financial and business information, thus reversing the
growing trend of corporations and the investment community to increase the amount of
information available to investors. Recently, however, a district court has refused to recog-
nize any distinction between the standards for the two actions, and stated that scienter is
required in enforcement suits. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., Civil No. 73-2458, slip op. at 30
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1976). For a discussion of this decision, see Brodsky, SEC Enforcement
Weapon May Be Blunted, 176 N.Y.L.J. 58, Sept. 22, 1976, at 1, col. 2.
32 96 S. Ct. at 1381 n.12. The question of the extent of the scienter requirement for
underwriters in particular will be faced by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
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position of greater investigative and disclosure obligations to meet
a "reckless behaviour standard" is quite possible. Indeed, applying
the "shingle" theory,3 3 courts may find that an underwriter's as-
sociation with an issue gives rise to an implied representation that
the underwriter has reasonable grounds to believe that the issuer is
fiscally sound.34 If, in fact, the issuer is financially unstable and the
underwriter has not conducted a thorough investigation, it can be
argued that the underwriter has vouched for the issuer's fiscal
soundness knowing that he lacked sufficient information upon
which to base this representation. In short, it is possible that a
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 96 S. Ct.
1659 (1976), discussed in note 34 infra.
" In certain instances those who sell securities publicly, who "hang out their shingles,"
are said to make implicit representations to their customers. See 5A A. JAcoBs, THE IMPACT
OF RULE lOb-5 § 210.03, at 9-14 to 9-15 (1974). In Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d
434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944), for example, the SEC revocation of a
broker-dealer's registration was upheld since the broker-dealer's nondisclosure of his prac-
tice of selling securities at prices substantially above the market was deemed to be an
omission of a material fact and a fraudulent device. Emphasizing the rapport which the
broker-dealer had established with his customers, the Second Circuit reasoned that as a
result of this confidential relationship, the broker had implicitly represented to its customers
that the price it was charging was "close to the market [price]." 139 F.2d at 437. Thus, the
broker's concealment of the price differential was held to be a fraud upon its customers.
Today, under the shingle theory, a failure to disclose facts which are contrary to one of
the implied representations amounts to a violation of rule lOb-5. See 5A A. JACOBS, THE
IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5 § 210.03, at 9-12 (1974). Some of the specific representations which
have been held to be implicitly made under the theory include representations that state-
ments of a stock's value are sound and that estimates of earning potential and similar
statements have an adequate basis in fact. See Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 114-15 (2d Cir.
1961) (Clark, J., concurring); 5A A. JAcoBs, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5 § 210.03, at 9-14 to
9-15 (1974).
U In Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.), vacated
and remanded, 96 S. Ct. 1659 (1976), the Seventh Circuit held that an underwriter's participa-
tion in an offering gives rise to "an implied representation that he has met the standards of
his profession in his investigation of the issuer." 524 F.2d at 1070. The court proceeded to
distinguish between the duties of investigation owed by an underwriter and a broker-dealer,
stating that while a broker-dealer may rely on published information, an underwriter, by
virtue of his special relationship with the issuer, is able to and must examine more than just
this readily available information. The court found a violation of rule 1Ob-5 since the
underwriter had given "his implied stamp of approval without having a reasonable basis for
concluding that the issue . . . [was] sound." Id. at 1071. In its initial decision, the Seventh
Circuit refused to discuss the appropriate general standard to be applied in civil actions
under rule lOb-5, preferring to determine the appropriate standard in the context of the
particular circumstances of each case. Id. at 1069. As a result of the Supreme Court's remand
of the case for reconsideration in light of Ernst, the Seventh Circuit has been given an
opportunity to decide whether, in the context of underwriter liability, scienter can be found
in a failure to meet an implied obligation to investigate or in some other variation of the
shingle theory. Of particular note in this area is Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973), in which the court, due to the
similarity in language between the two provisions, applied the requirements of rule lOb-5,
including scienter, in imposing liability on an underwriter for violation of § 14(e) of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970). It should be noted that the Supreme Court may
now be considering the propriety of this Chris-Craft decision since it has granted certiorari to
a later ruling of the Second Circuit on another issue in the same litigation. 96 S. Ct. 1505
(1976).
1976]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:639
material misrepresentation with scienter can be established through
the breach of what is essentially a duty of investigation.3 5 Admit-
tedly, this discussion is speculative in nature, but it is this very
uncertainty in the extent of and standards for liability which forces
an underwriter to adopt a much more conservative attitude and
demand greater information from the issuer.
Of particular note in this area is an administrative decision,
Walston & Co., 36 in which the SEC premised the finding of a
broker-dealer's violation of the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws upon a failure to sufficiently investigate the munici-
pal issuer and the resultant nondisclosure of material information.
The Commission underscored the obligation to properly investi-
gate:
It is incumbent on firms participating in an offering and on
dealers recommending municipal bonds to their customers as
"good municipal bonds" to make diligent inquiry, investigation
35 According to Dean Prosser, the requirement of scienter is satisfied when a person
makes a representation knowing that he lacks sufficient information upon which it may be
based. Establishing the existence of a lack of personal knowledge must depend on the
circumstances of the particular case and the reasonableness of inferring from those circum-
stances that the person "must have known that he did not know." W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 107, at 701 (4th ed. 1971).
Additionally, some courts have recognized a breach of a duty to investigate as a form of
scienter. For example, in Anderson v. Tway, 143 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 861 (1945), a bank vice president induced a friend of his, one Tway, to purchase
2000 shares of the bank's stock. The vice president did not know and thus did not reveal
that the bank's assets were impaired. When the bank's receiver sued to recover on the
note that Tway had executed in return for the stock, Tway argued in defense that he had
been defrauded. The receiver answered this argument by contending that since the bank
vice president did not know that the bank's assets were impaired, the scienter require-
ment for a fraud action had not been satisfied. Disagreeing with the receiver's conten-
tion, the Sixth Circuit noted: "It is now . . . very generally held that knowledge may be
attributed to persons making false representations in circumstances where it is their
duty to know whether such representations are true or false, or where they have the
means of knowing the truth." 143 F.2d at 99.
36 43 S.E.C. 508 (1967). Walston & Co., which had recently entered the municipal bond
business, sold some 250 bonds issued by the Rio Ramaza District in California. Harrington,
the vice president who handled the transaction, furnished the company's salesmen with an
offering circular which was adapted from the principal underwriter's circular. No other
information was given to the salesmen. The salesmen represented the bonds as either
"good," "high-grade," or "secure" municipal bonds. In fact, the bonds were highly specula-
tive. The entire tract making up the district was owned by one individual, and the district
had been formed by the vote of the six eligible voters on the tract. Furthermore, the owner
of the land, his son, and one other person were the directors of the district. Finally, the value
of the land was assessed at only $15,560, while the bond issue was for a $555,000 principal
amount. Harrington knew that only one individual owned the tract included in the district
and was aware of the facts concerning the election that formed the district, but he did not
inspect the land or inquire into the financial condition of its owner.
Walston & Co. and Harrington consented to findings that they had willfully violated §
17(a) of the Securities Act, § 10(b) and § 15(c)(1) of the Exchange Act, and rules lOb-5 and
15(c) 1-2. Both were censured; Walston & Co. was ordered to suspend its municipal securities
trading and dealing for 30 days, and Harrington was "suspended from association with a
broker or dealer for a period of 6 months .... " 43 S.E.C. at 513.
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and disclosure as to material facts relating to the issuer of the
securities and bearing upon the ability of the issuer to service
such bonds. It is, moreover, essential that dealers offering such bonds to
the public make certain that the offering circulars and other selling
literature are based upon an adequate investigation so that they accu-
rately reflect all material facts which a prudent investor should know in
order to evaluate the offering before reaching an investment decision.37
This statement, which sets a standard strikingly similar to the "due
diligence" obligation of section 11(e) of the Securities Act,38 illus-
trates the Commission's view of the duty owed to investors by
underwriters and broker-dealers of municipal bonds. Moreover,
the case itself demonstrates the extent to which the 1975 amend-
ments, by subjecting municipal bond dealers and brokers to regis-
tration and regulation by the SEC, have strengthened the need for
full disclosure by municipal issuers. Not only are municipal bond
brokers and dealers liable for civil damages under the antifraud
provisions, but they are now also subject to the full panoply of SEC
administrative enforcement procedures.3 9
37 43 S.E.C. at 512 (emphasis added). It has been noted that the Commission's language
in Walston appears to extend the standards of investigation applicable to registered offerings,
i.e., due diligence, to exempt offerings of municipal securities. Doty, Application of the
Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Law to Exempt Offerings: Duties of Underwriters and
Counsel, 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 393, 412-13 (1975). Although such an extension may
not be appropriate in civil actions for damages in view of Ernst, see notes 31-35 and
accompanying text supra, such a standard may still be applicable to injunctive actions under §
10(b) or rule 10b-5. See note 39 infra.
38 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1970). This section, which sets out the due diligence defense,
relieves an underwriter of liability under § 11 for material misrepresentations in the nonex-
pert sections of the registration statement if "he had, after reasonable investigation, reason-
able ground to believe and did believe... that the statements ... were true and that there
was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated ... or necessary to make the
statements ... not misleading .... Id. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1970).
While at first glance it may seem equitable to hold underwriters of municipal securities
to this standard, it has been pointed out that underwriters face a severe time constraint in
investigating the adequacy of the information furnished by the issuers. See text accompany-
ing note 59 infra. Moreover, even if underwriters did not face such severe time problems,
the lack of established criteria by which to judge the fiscal soundness of a governmental
entity raises serious doubts as to their ability to successfully evaluate the adequacy of the
information supplied. Id. Thus, it might well be unfair, as well as unrealistic, to hold
underwriters of municipal securities to the same due diligence standard which is applied to
underwriters of corporate securities.
39 The armament available to the SEC for enforcement purposes can be broken down
into three classifications: administrative disciplinary actions; equitable remedies; and crimi-
nal proceedings. An administrative disciplinary action may be maintained by the Commis-
sion against a registered dealer, including a municipal securities dealer, for any violation of,
inter alia, the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or the rules
promulgated thereunder. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o (Supp. 1976). In an action of this kind, the
finding of a wilful violation may result in the imposition of various administrative sanctions
ranging from censure to revocation of the offending party's registration with the SEC. See
id. § 78o(b)(4)(D). It is important to note that the wilfulness requirement will be satisfied
if the broker breaches his duty of investigation. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 595-96 (2d
Cir. 1969); Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1967); see Doty, Application of the
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As a result of these and other potential liabilities40 and the loss
Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws to Exempt Offerings: Duties of Underwriters and
Counsel, 16 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 393, 412-15 (1975).
Equitable enforcement procedures available to the Commission include the power to
bring an action for the purpose of enjoining "any acts or practices which constitute or will
constitute a violation of the provisions of.. ." the Securities Act or the Exchange Act or rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d)
(Supp. 1976). It should again be noted that the Supreme Court has specifically reserved the
question "whether scienter is a necessary element in an action for injunctive relief under
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1381 n.12 (1976). Thus,
it is possible that a standard of negligence may ultimately be adopted in an action brought by
the Commission for injunctive relief under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Indeed, the Second
Circuit utilizes a negligence standard in such enforcement actions, while requiring scienter in
private civil liability suits. Compare SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), with Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d
1277, 1304-05 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc) and SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
866-69 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (Friendly, Kaufman & Anderson, JJ.. concurring), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). For a discussion of the Second Circuit's position, see note 31
supra. In addition to the statutory authority of the SEC to seek an injunction, other equitable
remedies often sought by the Commission include consent decrees and disgorgement of
profits obtained by unlawful insider trading. For an excellent discussion of the various
equitable remedies available to the SEC, including an evaluation of some remedies of recent
origin, see Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1188
(1975).
The initiation of criminal proceedings may be recommended to the Attorney General by
the SEC when a wilfull breach of disclosure duties is discovered. Securities Act § 20(b),
15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970); Exchange Act § 21(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(d) (Supp. 1976). For a
discussion of such criminal prosecutions, see Mathews, Criminal Prosecutions Under the Federal
Securities Law and Related Statutes: The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 39 GEo.
WAST. L. REv. 901, 946 (1971).
40 In addition to possible liability based on an implied representation of issuer sound-
ness, underwriters and broker-dealers involved in municipal bond transactions may face
liability due to breaches of their other duties. For example, they have an obligation to
determine whether municipal bonds are a suitable investment for their customer. If it is
determined that bonds are a worthwhile investment, the underwriter must then ascertain
whether a particular bond issue properly fulfills the investment needs and goals of its
customer. See SEC v. Charles A. Morris & Associates, 386 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D. Tenn. 1973).
A securities professional's liability in this area is based on a refinement of the "shingle" and
"fair dealing" concepts, and is generally known as the "suitability" requirement. For an
extensive discussion of the suitability theory, see 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3708-27
(Supp. 1969).
Professor Loss ascribes the development of the suitability theory to the use of high-
pressure sales tactics to force a customer to hastily purchase speculative securities. Id. These
sales tactics have become known as "boiler room" operations. See United States v. Ross, 321
F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 894 (1964); United States v. Rollnick, 91
F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1937). The SEC has stated that:
[The antifraud] provisions contemplate, at the least, that recommendations of a
security made to proposed purchasers shall have a reasonable basis and that they shall
be accompanied by disclosure of known or easily ascertainable facts bearing upon
the justification for the representations.
Best Securities, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931, 934 (1960) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Fur-
ther, the SEC has taken the position that a broker-dealer who sells a security exempted from
the registration requirements of the Securities Act incurs a greater obligation to determine
the suitability of the investment, since the customer is not afforded the added protection of
the registration process. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445 (Feb. 2, 1962), reprinted in 2
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 22,753.
Until recently, questions of suitability did not play an important role in a municipal
securities professional's operations. Most purchasers of municipal securities were highly
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of investor confidence, the marketplace has forced municipalities to
supply the investing public with disclosure documents which in
detail and length equal or exceed the required corporate docu-
ments. A review of official statements issued by municipalities seek-
ing to market securities during the first 6 months of 1976 reveals a
significant increase in the amount of information disclosed. New
York City is a prime example. Pre-1976 New York City disclosure
documents consisted of a notice of sale and a statement of the
terms of the issue. In 1976, however, the offering statement issued
in connection with the sale of $185 million in New York City
general obligation serial bonds extended to 96 pages, of which 53
pages were devoted to the city's fiscal crisis.41 The reality of ex-
panded disclosure is not limited to New York City with its fiscal
problems. Despite an excellent credit reputation, the County of
sophisticated investors, interested in large denomination notes. Typically, the purchaser of
municipal bonds was the local banker who bought securities for the bank's own account. It
was not necessary to provide him with detailed information because he already possessed it.
The local banker knew the tax collection experience of the municipality, the background of
the municipal officers, the practices of the community, tax procedures, principal employers,
median income, and a host of other information now included in offering statements.
Individual investors did not become a significant factor in the municipal bond market until
the 1950's when rising wages and increasing taxes made municipal bonds attractive to
individuals in the middle income tax brackets. See S. REP., supra note 1, at 41-42; Municipal
Bonds, supra note 1, at 565. The following table is indicative of this trend:
Annual Net Changes in Holdings of Municipal Securities
by Major Holder Groups (1970-1975)
(Amounts are par values in billions of dollars)
1975*
First Second
Holder 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 quarter quarter
Commercial banks 10.7 12.6 7.2 5.7 5.5 -2.7 6.9
Households -. 8 -. 2 1.0 4.3 10.0 13.9 9.3
All other** 1.3 5.2 6.2 3.7 1.9 2.9 4.5
Total 11.2 17.6 14.4 13.7 17.4 14.0 20.7
Source: Unpublished flow of funds data from the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (Processed: August 19, 1975)
* Annual rate.
** This includes corporate business, state and local general funds, mutual savings
banks, insurance companies, state and local government retirement funds, and
brokers and dealers.
Congressional Budget Office, New York City's Fiscal Problem: Its Origins, Potential Reper-
cussions, and Some Alternative Policy Responses 8 (Oct. 10, 1975).
As a result of the proliferation of individuals in the municipal securities markets, the
suitability doctrine has taken on added significance to municipal securities professionals and
provides another area of possible liability. Both SEC v. R.J. Allen & Associates, 386 F. Supp.
866 (S.D. Fla. 1974), and SEC v. Charles A. Morris & Associates, 386 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D.
Tenn. 1973), illustrate the use of this doctrine to support findings of antifraud violations in
particularly reprehensible municipal securities sales operations.
41 Official Statement of the City of New York, March 15, 1976.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:639
Nassau of the State of New York has been forced by various
market factors to prepare a comparable document consisting of 69
pages including 31 pages of financial statements. 42 Similarly, the
State of New York, in order to meet the information demands of
the underwriters, prepared an 88-page document in connection
with an offering of $59 million general obligation serial bonds. 43
Further afield, the City of Baltimore issued a 108-page document
in connection with a $34.35 million offering of general obligation
serial bonds. 44 Clearly, as a practical matter, disclosure require-
ments have been imposed on municipal issuers despite congres-
sional refusal to take such action. The lack of definitive legislation,
however, has generated both uncertainty and confusion in the law
of disclosure relevant to municipal securities.
CONTENTS OF DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS
In the private sector, the extent of disclosure required for the
issuance of securities has been delineated by the SEC through the
development of elaborate instructions, 4 5 rules, 46 and guidelines 47
that have the status of law.48 A private corporation preparing an
offering statement can find some comfort in the fact that the
Commission requires the disclosure of certain enumerated infor-
mation. If an issuer has disclosed all material information called for
in the SEC's forms and rules, it has some assurance that its disclo-
sure obligations have been fulfilled.49
In the municipal securities area, however, there is no compar-
'2 Official Statement of the County of Nassau, June 1, 1976.
43 Official Statement of the State of New York, May 14, 1976.
41 Preliminary Official Statement of the City of Baltimore, April 15, 1976.
" See, e.g., General Instructions to Form S-i, reprinted in 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 7122
(1976).
46See, e.g., SEC Rules 406-15, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.406-.415 (1976).
4' See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936 (Dec. 9, 1968), reprinted in 1 CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 3760.
48 Compare 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1938 (2d ed. 1961), with 1 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.03, at 298-300 (1958). It should be noted that materiality
and accuracy are still the ultimate criteria applied to determine the extent of information
necessary in corporate disclosure documents:
In addition to the information expressly required to be included in a registration
statement, there shall be added such further material information, if any, as may be
necessary to make the required statements, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading.
SEC Rule 408, 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (1976).
19 In addition to the availability of carefully drawn directives and SEC guidance during
preparation of the disclosure documents, corporate issuers must, before the registration
statement will be declared effective, submit it for Commission review. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a)
(1970). Filing with and review by the Commission, however, does not imply SEC approval of
either the securities or the adequacy and accuracy of the disclosure. See SEC Rule 425, 17
C.F.R. § 230.425 (1976) (disclaimer of Commission approval must be printed on all prospec-
tuses).
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able set of rules upon which the draftsman of an offering state-
ment may rely to ensure adequate disclosure and avoid liability for
omissions. Similarly, resort to judicial doctrines is of little use since
the question of liability for nondisclosure involves the issue of
materiality,5" an issue that is a mixed question of law and fact
requiring "delicate assessments of the inferences a 'reasonable
shareholder' would draw from a given set of facts and the sig-
nificance of those inferences to him .... -51 In short, this determi-
nation, though based on a general legal standard, is fundamentally
unique to each particular factual setting. Although the materiality
problem is common to both corporate and municipal issuers, the
draftsman of a municipal securities offering statement is forced to
make potentially devastating disclosure decisions without the bene-
fit of any guidance from the Congress, the courts, or the SEC. 2
So The proper definition of the term "materiality" has been the subject of much litiga-
tion, see Doty, Application of the Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws to Exempt
Offerings: Duties of Underwriters and Counsel, 16 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 393, 403-04 (1975),
which has divided the circuits. Compare Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255,
269 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972), with Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d
579, 603-04 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). The difficulty stems, at least in part,
from Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), wherein the Court held that a
misstatement need not have a decisive effect to be material. A misstatement is material if a
reasonable investor might consider it important and a causal relationship exists between the
misstatement and the injury. Id. at 384-85. Refining this definition in Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), the Court withdrew the requirement of reliance and
stated that representations or omissions were material when a "reasonable investor might
have considered them important in the making of [an investment] decision." Id. at 154
(emphasis added).
Since the proper standard of materiality was not the central issue presented in either
Mills or Affiliated Ute, lower courts disagreed on whether the appropriate standard was that
the reasonable investor would be affected or whether it was sufficient that he might be
affected by the representation. In Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1302 (2d
Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit opted for the tort definition, asking "whether a reasonable
man would attach importance to the fact misrepresented in determining his choice of action
. .... Id. at 1302, quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965); accord, Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 603-04 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). Meanwhile, the Third Circuit, in Ronson Corp. v.
Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 483 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870
(1974), and the Seventh Circuit chose "a test that includes all facts which a reasonable
stockholder might consider important." Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324,
330 (7th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2126 (1976).
In TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2126 (1976), the Supreme Court, in the
context of § 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970), dismissed the language in
Affiliated Ute as obiter dictum, 96 S. Ct. at 2132 n.9, and set the following standard of
materiality:
[A]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote. . . .What the
standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all
the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the
deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.
Id. at 2133 (emphasis added). The Court concluded its discussion by stating that with this
standard in mind, the final determination of whether the misstatement is material should
normally be left to the trier of facts. Id.; see text accompanying note 51 infra.
11 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2126, 2133 (1976).
52 Disclosure by municipal issuers is problematical not only because of lack of official
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The Municipal Finance Officers Association (MFOA) has at-
tempted to fill this vacuum by issuing a draft of disclosure guide-
lines. 53 The guidelines are intended to provide the same type of
guidance to the draftsmen of municipal offering statements as is
afforded corporate issuers by the SEC. These directives, however,
even when fully adopted by the MFOA, will not be legally binding,
and can, therefore, unlike the SEC rules, be no more than unoffi-
cial instructions. 54 In addition, the guidelines as released apply to
all tax-exempt offerings by state or municipal entities 55 and, con-
sequently, represent broad generalities. Similarly, they apply to all
offerings, even smaller offerings that are placed privately, often
through negotiations with institutional or other highly sophisti-
cated investors. 56 Clearly, the test, in all cases, for inclusion of
information in a municipal securities offering statement will con-
tinue to be materiality.57 And, the answer to that test, in municipal
issues, must be arrived at without the benefit of authoritative guid-
ance.
Recognizing the difficulty and cost of the present pattern of
detailed disclosure, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board
(MSRB) has stated that it supports limiting both disclosure re-
guidance, but also because of the lack of uniformity in the preparation of audit or financial
statements issued by governmental entities. Although both the American Institute of Cer-
tified Public Accountants (AICPA) and the National Committee on Governmental Account-
ing (NCGA), a group sponsored by the Municipal Finance Officers Association, do publish
and disseminate guidelines, see AICPA, AUDITS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL UNITS
(1974); NCGA, GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING, AUDITING, AND FINANCIAL REPORTING (1968),
a problem arises when these guidelines conflict with state and local standards, for it has been
argued that in this situation local standards will supercede AICPA guidelines. If this is so,
national uniformity will be impossible to achieve absent federal disclosure guidelines. It
should be noted, however, that the AICPA manual provides that when an auditor conducts a
financial audit he must normally report in accordance with the accepted standards of the
profession. See AICPA, AUDITS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 40 (1974). Thus,
AICPA takes the position that state and local standards do not override AICPA guidelines;
yet it recognizes that state and local laws obviously do override AICPA guidelines. See id. at
135, app. A. To provide some uniformity in this area, and to reduce the complexities of
reading and understanding municipal financial statements, both AICPA and NCGA have
published a set of principles to be followed in the financial reporting of all governmental
units. These principles are essentially concerned with preparation of annual budgets, meth-
ods of reporting, valuations of fixed assets, and the organization and operation of the funds.
See AICPA, AUDITS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL UNITS app. A (1974); NCGA,
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING, AUDITING, AND FINANCIAL REPORTING 3-14 (1968).
53 MFOA, DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES FOR OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES BY STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS (1975).
'4 See id. at 1.
55 The drafting committee has received recommendations that separate guidelines be
developed for local revenue bonds, general obligation bonds, short-term bonds, and other
major bond categories.
-" An exemption similar to the private placement exemption contained in rule 146, 17
C.F.R. § 230.146 (1976), has been proposed.57 See Doty, Application of the Antifraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws to Exempt
Offerings: Duties of Underwriters and Counsel, 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 393, 403-09 (1975).
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quirements and liabilities in the issuance of municipal securities.58
The MSRB explained its position as follows:
Information on which to base an investment decision often is
unavailable with respect to municipal securities. Indeed, substan-
tial uncertainty exists concerning the nature and scope of such
information and the appropriate form of its presentation. In
order to bring their securities to market in recent months, many
issuers of municipal securities have undergone protracted and
costly negotiations with underwriters for increasingly com-
prehensive and possibly non-material items of disclosure. Un-
derwriters, for their part, are asked to assess their potential
liabilities without guidance as to what information may or may
not be material.
•. 
* Y
(3) The vast majority of general obligation securities are
sold through competitive bid. Often, the competitive bid proce-
dure is mandated by state law on the theory that it results in
lower costs to borrowers and is therefore in the public interest.
At the same time, the competitive bid process imposes severe
time constraints on underwriters in their ability to ascertain the
adequacy of information supplied to them by issuers. The time
elapsing between publication of a notice of sale and the date bids
are required to be submitted often does not exceed seven days
and almost never exceeds two weeks.
While the time constraints imposed by the bidding process
make it impossible for underwriters to undertake an investiga-
tion in depth of a municipal issuer's affairs, it is questionable
whether such an investigation would be feasible under any cir-
cumstances with respect to issuers of general obligation securi-
ties. In comparison to the well-recognized indicia of the viability
of business corporations, the factors that contribute to the health
of a governmental entity are at once complex and not readily
determinable.
In view of these factors, we believe it appropriate to limit the
liabilities of underwriters in the municipal area by affording
them a defense based on the absence of reasonable grounds to
believe or belief that the information furnished by the issuer
contains a material misstatement or omission. This approach
would eliminate the imposition of a due diligence obligation on
underwriters of municipal securities which, for the reasons pre-
viously stated, cannot be fulfilled.
(4) Issuers should be responsible for the accuracy and com-
pleteness of information contained in an official statement which
they prepare or which is derived from their own records. We do
not believe, however, that an issuer should be held responsible
for information derived from public sources not under the con-
58 Hearings on S. 2969 & S. 2574 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 388-94 (1976).
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trol or jurisdiction of the issuer in the absence of actual knowl-
edge or reckless disregard for the accuracy or completeness of
such information.
59
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
In late 1975, considerable pressure began to build for major
legislation dealing with disclosure in the sale of municipal securi-
ties. Interest in such legislation arose during the debates on the
1975 amendments to the federal securities laws. At that time,
Senator Eagleton attempted to amend the 1975 legislation to repeal
the exemption in the Securities Act for obligations of state and
local governments.6" This amendment was subsequently withdrawn,
but Senator Williams, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Securities
of the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, agreed to
hold hearings and attempt to report out a bill on municipal disclo-
sure in 1976.61
As a result of the continued exemption of municipal securities
from federal regulation, 62 congressional authority to enact such
regulations has not been seriously challenged and has, therefore,
never been clearly defined. Nonetheless, increasingly expansive
interpretations of federal commerce clause power, 63 even when it
was exercised to control the activities of a state, 64 appeared to have
"Id. at 389-93.
60 121 CONG. REC. 21,192-93 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1975) (remarks of Senator Eagleton).
611d. at 21,197 (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
62 See note 14supra.
63 See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (Congress can
regulate intrastate activities having a "close and substantial" relation to interstate commerce);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (production of wheat for home consumption exerts
a "substantial economic effect" upon interstate commerce and thus may be regulated);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (Congress may prohibit conduct when a
rational basis exists for finding it "generally" burdensome to interstate commerce).
64 Use of the commerce power to control state activity seems to have reached a high
water mark in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled, National League of Cities v.
Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465, 2476 (1976). The Wirtz Court held that Congress could exercise its
commerce clause authority to regulate state activities regardless of whether these were
characterized as "governmental" or "proprietary." The Court relied upon its statement in
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936) that "we look to the activities in which the
states have traditionally engaged as marking the boundary of the restriction upon the
federal taxing power. But there is no such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate
commerce." Id. at 185, quoted in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 198 (1968). Federal control
of state functions which affect interstate commerce was apparently reaffirmed in Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975). There, the Court noted that a federal freeze on public
employee wages as part of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 was an even less intrusive
regulation than the statute at issue in Wirtz. Id. at 548.
Federalism problems also confronted the Court in delineating the scope of the taxing
power of the national and state governments over each other's instrumentalities. Initially, a
broad doctrine of reciprocal immunity, based on Chief Justice Marshall's comment that "the
power to tax involves the power to destroy," McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
431 (1819), was utilized. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575 (1946). This
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left little doubt that the federal government could regulate the
entire securities industry regardless of the involvement of state and
local governments. In National League of Cities v. Usery,65 however,
the Supreme Court abruptly narrowed its broad interpretation of
congressional authority and held that state sovereignty limitations
on the commerce power prohibited federal legislation which would
"operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure inte-
gral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions
. ... 66 Explaining that there exist certain attributes of state
sovereignty which are protected from congressional interference by
a constitutional limitation, 67 Justice Rehnquist stated that the criti-
immunity of the states was gradually restricted due to the expansion of state governmental
activity into traditionally private areas and the concomitant withdrawal of otherwise avail-
able federal revenue sources. The Court distinguished between traditional governmental
functions and traditional private activity, according tax immunity to states when engaged in
the former but not when engaged in the latter. See id. at 579; United States v. California, 297
U.S. 175, 184-85 (1936); Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 524 (1926).
In New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), Justice Frankfurter, in an opinion
joined only by Justice Rutledge, asserted that Congress' taxing power over the states was
limited only by the requirement that it be exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner. Id. at
582. Chief Justice Stone, however, in a concurring opinion joined by three other Justices,
refused to discard the traditional governmental functions distinction and stated that the
taxing power could not be used where it would interfere unduly with the performance of
"sovereign functions of government." Id at 586 (Stone, C.J., concurring). Congress has
adopted this limitation in the Internal Revenue Code. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 115(a)(1).
65 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976). In 1974, Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to
extend the coverage of the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to most public
employees. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, §§ 6(a)(1)(5)(6),
88 Stat. 55, amending 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1970). A prior partial extension of the wage and hour
requirements to certain categories of public employees had been the subject of the Court's
sweeping affirmation of federal commerce clause power over the States in Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), discussed in note 64 supra. The National League Court specifically
overruled Wirtz 96 S. Ct. at 2476.
66 96 S. Ct. at 2474. It should be noted that the "traditional governmental functions"
distinction had been rejected in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195 (1968) and United
States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183 (1936), and has been criticized in the tax immunity
area, see note 64 supra, as "too shifting a basis for determining constitutional power and too
entangled in expediency to serve as a dependable legal criterion." New York v. United
States, 326 U.S. 572, 580 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.).
67 96 S. Ct. at 2471. The affirmative constitutional limitation upon which Justice Rehn-
quist relies is attested to, if not necessarily embodied in, the tenth amendment: "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. Analysis of
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 549 (1976), suggests that
the actual basis of this limitation on congressional authority is not the language of the tenth
amendment itself, but is rather an affirmative immunity to congressional power inherent in
the federal system. Id. at 553 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Discussing the Court's opinion in
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), which he regarded as "critical to the
development of the doctrine which the [Fry] Court today applies," 421 U.S. at 549, Justice
Rehnquist concluded that the California Court's refusal to apply the federalism concepts
which justified limited state immunity from federal taxation to the commerce clause power
was without justification. Noting that the taxation immunity is based solely on federalism, he
indicated that a restriction on the commerce clause is also supported by the tenth amend-
ment. Although it does not expressly prohibit congressional action, the tenth amendment is
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cal question is whether the particular state attribute is " 'essential to
separate and independent existence.' "6 If this question is an-
swered in the affirmative, Congress may not abolish the states'
authority to fulfill those functions. Thus, in National League, the
Court found that the minimum wage and maximum hour provi-
sions of the Fair Labor Standards Act,69 if applied to the states,
would significantly supplant important policy decisions upon which
the performance of integral governmental functions 70 depend.
This interference was deemed impermissible since the states' power
to determine the method and manner of fulfilling traditional gov-
ernmental functions was considered essential to independent exis-
tence.7
1
Careful analysis of National League indicates that the determi-
nation of the proper relationship between the federal and state
governments will apparently embody a balancing of interests. 72
an expression of the understanding inherent in the federalist system that each state is a
sovereign. Consequently, Congress may not treat a state "as if it were just another individual
or business enterprise . I... d. at 557. Justice Douglas espoused similar views in his dissent
to Maryland v. Wirtz, 302 U.S. 183, 201-05 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
68 96 S. Ct. at 2471, quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911), quoting Lane
County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868).
69 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974). The Act provides that
covered employers must pay a minimum wage, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1970), and keep em-
ployment records, id. § 211 (c). They are prohibited from employing individuals for more
than a specified number of hours per week, unless the employees receive time and a half for
overtime. Id. § 207(a)(3).
70 96 S. Ct. at 2474. The Court mentioned several areas of activity within which state
governments traditionally discharge the functions of public law administration and public
service furnishment: fire and police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and
recreation. Id. The Court observed that "[tihese examples are obviously not an exhaustive
catalogue of the numerous . . . activities which are well within the area of traditional
operations of state and local governments." Id. n.16.
71 96 S. Ct. at 2473-74. The Court overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968),
which had upheld an earlier extension of the Fair Labor Standards Act to employees of state
hospitals, institutions, and schools. Justice Rehnquist observed that obvious differences exist
between the schools and hospitals affected in Wirtz and the police and fire departments
involved here, but "each provides an integral portion of those governmental services which
the States . . . have traditionally afforded their citizens." 96 S. Ct. at 2476.
72 The Court's suggestion that temporary legislation enacted in the context of a national
emergency, see note 75 and accompanying text infra, can be read in connection with Justice
Blackmun's concurrence, 96 S. Ct. at 2476 (Blackmun, J., concurring), to indicate that such a
balance was struck here. Consideration of the opinions of all the Justices lends further
support to the proposition that the guiding principle in this area embodies a balancing of
federal and state interests. The dissent of Justice Brennan, with whom Justices White and
Marshall joined, adhered to the position that the commerce clause power should be re-
garded as paramount to any state interest. Id. at 2477 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens, in a separate dissent, was unable to find any distinction between the activity regulated
in this case and other state activity which is clearly subject to federal regulation, and
therefore concluded that the wage and hour provisions were valid. Id. at 2488 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Thus, four members of the Court have apparently espoused a balancing ap-
proach, at least in national emergency situations; at least three Justices found the federal
interest controlling in all cases; and Justice Blackmun cast the deciding vote on the under-
standing that, in fact, a balancing approach had been adopted.
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Clearly, a showing of a rational relationship between the legislation
and interstate commerce will be insufficient to justify federal regu-
lation of an essential state activity.73 A showing of an important
federal interest in a particular objective, coupled with a necessity
for state compliance to achieve that goal, however, should provide
the counterweight necessary to overcome the protection of state
functions essential to independent existence. Indeed, it was the
understanding of Justice Blackmun, whose concurrence in National
League was decisive, that the majority opinion embodied just such a
balancing approach.7 4 Significantly, Justice Rehnquist also noted
that the state sovereignty limitation is not absolute, but will cer-
tainly succumb to federal authority in cases presenting carefully
drafted legislation designed to combat a national emergency.75
Consequently, resolution of the question of federal commerce
clause authority over issuers of municipal securities seems to call
for a two-tier approach. First, is the issuance of securities an attri-
bute of state sovereignty essential to separate and independent
existence?7 6 If so, is the federal interest in regulating municipal
issuers "demonstrably greater" than that involved in public sector
hours and wages, and is state compliance with federal regulation in
the municipal securities area essential? In view of the importance to
the nation of broad public participation in financial markets, the
73 See 96 S. Ct. at 2473.74 1d. at 2476 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
75 Id. at 2474-75. Although Justice Blackmun chose to view the Court's decision as
applying a balancing approach, Justice Rehnquist very narrowly circumscribed the extent to
which emergency situations would justify federal intrusion upon the sovereignty of the
states. In reconciling Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (wage freeze upheld), with
National League, Justice Rehnquist stated that Fy presented a "temporary enactment tailored
to combat a national emergency," and thus was distinguishable from the instant case which
did not involve such narrowly drawn legislation. 96 S. Ct. at 2475. The question remains
whether this reconciliation is to be viewed as a special exception to the state sovereignty
limitation or an implicit adoption of a balancing approach. In either case, the term "national
emergency" needs to be defined so as to clarify how immediate and extensive the problem
must be. Justice Blackmun's concurrence indicates that environmental protection is an
appropriate area for federal regulation, thus implying that the national emergency need not
be as immediate as the one presented in Fry and that the legislation may extend beyond
temporary enactments to long-range solutions for foreseeable national problems. 96 S. Ct. at
2476 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
7' In a suit brought to enjoin both SEC investigation of New York City securities and
enforcement of the federal antifraud provisions against the city, New York argued that the
issuance of securities is a fulfillment of the financing function of local governments and thus
"is essential to their existence and operation as separate and independent political and
governmental entities." Complaint at 3, City of New York v. SEC, Civil No. 76-3307
(S.D.N.Y., filed July 27, 1976). In contrast, SEC Commissioner Philip A. Loomis, testifying
before the House Consumer Protection Subcommittee, argued that federal regulation of the
municipal securities market would not displace state policies regarding the delivery of
essential governmental services. Rather, such regulation "facilitates the creation of a viable
municipal securities market in which States can raise funds with which to carry out their
traditional functions." BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 368, at A-3 (Sept. 1, 1976).
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increased role played in these national markets by municipal
financing, and the lack of sufficient state authority to ensure,
throughout the country,7 7 the open and honest financial disclosure
upon which public participation rests, federal regulation of munic-
ipal issuers through carefully drafted legislation should be constitu-
tionally permissible.
The principal legislative proposals presently before the Con-
gress are the Eagleton bill78 and the Williams bill.79 The major
difference between these legislative proposals is the extent of SEC
jurisdiction. The Eagleton bill would repeal the general municipal
securities exemption contained in the Securities Act and confer
authority to the Commission to exempt any class of these securi-
ties.80 The ultimate effect of such selective exemptions would be
the imposition of the full rigors of registration, including SEC
review of disclosure documents, upon the issuers of nonexempt
securities. Aside from the grave constitutional problems inherent in
such pervasive regulation of the financing function of state and
local governments,8 ' this proposal fails to recognize the essential
differences between the marketing of corporate and municipal
securities.8 2 This oversight would result in either a superimposing
upon the municipal securities market of regulations and statutes
tailored for the corporate field,83 or a grant of authority to the SEC
without any clear congressional guidance. Moreover, the SEC has
expressed opposition to this plan, stating that it would be unable to
absorb the additional regulatory burden required by the Eagleton
1The fragmentation of regulation inherent in state control of securities presents the
largest obstacle to uniform and effective securities regulation. See generally Goodkind, Blue
Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements?, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 79. In addition, state
regulation is further thwarted by the municipal securities exemption contained in nearly all
Blue Sky Laws. See note 14 supra.
78 S. 2574, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), discussed in Note, Federal Regulation of Municipal
Securities, 60 MINN. L. REV. 567, 591 n.158 (1976).
71 S. 2969, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The Williams bill has also been introduced in the
House of Representatives. H.R. 15205, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
80 S. 2574, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
s See notes 65-77 and accompanying text supra.
s For a discussion of the differences between the underwriting processes for municipal
and corporate bonds, see Municipal Bonds, supra note 1, at 567-74. The Eagleton bill fails to
differentiate between the liability of municipal and corporate officials, and thus might allow
unwarranted attachments against municipal officials. More importantly, the Eagleton bill
would subject municipal issuers to SEC review of disclosure documents and the accompany-
ing Securities Act restrictions on selling activities in the prefiling, waiting, and posteffective
periods. See Hearings on S. 2969 & S. 2574 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976). SEC Chairman
Roderick Hills testified that neither the industry nor the Commission could absorb the
increased burdens of cost, time, and manpower which the Eagleton bill would impose. Id. at
21. The deficiencies in this proposal were discussed briefly in Note, Federal Regulation of
Municipal Securities, 60 MINN. L. REv. 567, 591 n.158 (1976).
" See note 82 supra.
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bill, that the Commission's oversight of private securities would
suffer, and that the Commission's enforcement division can protect
the public without the imposition of Securities Act disclosure re-
quirements upon municipal issuers. 4
The Williams bill, in contradistinction, was drafted in conjunc-
tion with the SEC. It does not embody any amendments to the
Securities Act, but rather provides for the addition of a new section
13A to the Exchange Act. Proposed section 13A requires the prep-
aration and limited dissemination of annual reports by issuers
having more than $50 million in municipal securities outstanding
during any portion of a fiscal year 85 and distribution statements by
'4 SEC Chairman Hills, in opposing the Eagleton bill's requirement of SEC clearance for
disclosure documents, expressed concern that the burden imposed by the bill is one that the
Commission could not bear, and further, that even if they could do so, the threatened harm
to investors does not justify so drastic a proposal. See Hearings on S. 2969 & S. 2574 Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 21, 23 (1976). Chairman Hills' prediction of a massive regulatory burden is sup-
ported by statistics indicating that the number of municipal issues runs from 2500 to 8000
per year, in comparison to fewer than 1000 corporate issues.
11 S. 2969, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(e) (1976). The annual report required by proposed
§ 13A(a)(2) of the Exchange Act would include the following information:
(A) An identification and description of the issuer of the securities outstand-ing; (B) A description of any legal limitation on the incurrence of indebtedness by
the issuer or the taxing authority of the issuer; ,
(C) A description of the issuer's debt structure, including information with
respect to amounts of authorized and outstanding funded debt; estimated amount
of short term debt, character of amortization provisions of funded debt, sinking
fund requirements, security for debt, nature and extent of guaranteed debt, and
debt service requirements;
(D) A description of the nature and extent of other material contingent
liabilities or commitments of the issuer;
(E) If any payment of principal or interest on any security of the issuer or any
predecessor thereof has been defaulted on, or has been postponed or delayed,
within the past twenty years, a description of the date, amounts and circumstances
of such event and of the terms of any succeeding arrangements thereof;
(F) A description of the issuer's tax authority and structure over the past five
years including the nature of taxes levied, tax rates, property (real and personal)
valuation and assessment procedures, amounts of property valuations and assess-
ments, amounts of tax levies, amounts of tax collections and delinquent tax proce-
dures and experience;
(G) A description of the issuer's major taxpayers;
(H) A description of the principal governmental and other services provided
or performed by the issuer, the extent to which similar or differing services are
performed by other governmental entities which serve the same geographic area
and any major changes in such services in the last ten years;
(I) A description of the nature and extent of Federal or other assistance
programs available to the issuer; and
U) Financial statements of the issuer in such detail and form and for such
periods beginning not earlier than the fifth previous fiscal year as the Commission
may prescribe, which statements for any fiscal year commencing on or after De-
cember 31, 1978, shall be audited and reported on by an independent public or
certified accountant in such manner a's the Commission may prescribe.
Id. § 13A(a)(2). The reports containing this information must be made available, at the
issuer's expense, to all security holders. Any other person may also obtain a report after
payment of a reasonable fee. Id. § 13A(f)(I). In addition, the issuer must file the report for
public examination at a location designated by the Commission and, if the Commission
chooses, at a central repository. Id. § 13A(f)(3).
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those issuers offering more than $5 million in any one issue of
municipal securities.8 6 Furthermore, in an apparent attempt to
relieve the underwriter's concern over possible liability for nondis-
closure, the bill also limits such liability to the underwriter's partici-
pation in the issue, unless, as in the case of a lead underwriter, it
received a benefit from the issuer not shared in by other similarly
situated underwriters. 87 Unlike the Eagleton bill, Senator Williams'
proposal both specifies guidelines to be followed by the SEC in
prescribing disclosure requirements88 and avoids the imposition of
corporate disclosure obligations upon the municipal security mar-
ket.89 Moreover, the Williams bill exempts an issuer from the
distribution statement provisions if the disclosure in connection
with the issue has been approved, after a hearing, by an indepen-
dent state authority. 90 Despite these various legislative qualifica-
tions upon issuer disclosure, the Williams bill would grant the SEC
broad authority to modify the minimum amounts necessary to
invoke the disclosure obligation, to add and delete informational
items from the disclosure documents, to prescribe the forms, finan-
86 Id. § 13A(b)(1). Under this section, the distribution statement must contain all items
required by the annual report, see note 85 supra, in addition to the following:
(A) A description of the offering, including amount to be offered, price, plan
of distribution, and underwriting arrangements and compensation;
(B) A description of the security to be offered, including provisions as to
security, events of default, payment of principal and interest, sinking fund, re-
demption, debt reserve funds, priority, legality and authorization for issue and
rights of security holders to bring suit against issuers;
(C) A description of any project or enterprise of the issuer to be financed from
the proceeds of revenue or special assessment securities, and any engineering or
financial feasibility reports or studies on the construction and operations of the
project or enterprise;
(D) A description of the intended use of the proceeds of the offering;
(E) A statement of counsel's opinion as to the legality of the issuance of the
securities to be offered;
(F) A statement of the availability of the reports required by this section; and
(G) Such other similar and specific information as the Commission may by
rules or regulations require as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
S. 2969, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 13A(b)(2) (1976). Certain securities, however, would be
exempted from these requirements. See note 90 and accompanying text infra.
The distribution statements would have to be made available to all brokers, dealers, and
banks "acting as agent for delivery to prospective purchasers." S. 2969, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 13A(f)(2). The Commission could also require the issuer to file the statement at a desig-
nated location and at a central repository. Id. § 13A(f)(3).
87 S. 2969, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 13A(g). This subsection was derived from § 1 (e) of
the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970).
88 See notes 85 & 86 and accompanying text supra.
89 Since the municipal securities exemption of the Securities Act is retained, any ques-
tion of the direct applicability of corporate requirements to municipal issuers is removed.
90 S. 2969, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 13A(c)(1) (1976). It is believed that federal regulation
in this instance is unnecessary, since active state supervision of the offering would provide
adequate protection to investors. Proposed § 13A(c)(2) also provides several exemptions
based on those found in the Securities Act. The most important of these exemptions is the
small offering exemption. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
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cial statements, and accounting method to be used in preparing the
reports, and to designate a location at which the reports must be
filed and available for public inspection.91 Thus, the Williams bill
segregates municipal securities disclosure regulations from cor-
porate disclosure policies, initially delimits SEC jurisdiction to those
municipalities that exceed the minimum dollar amounts, presents a
framework within which the contents of disclosure documents may
be formulated, and preserves flexibility by granting broad author-
ity to the SEC in which to operate, and, in some instances, modify
the proposed legislative scheme.
CONCLUSION
In 1933, the expenditures for state and local government ap-
proximated $7 billion. In 1976, such expenditures will exceed $200
billion, exclusive of Federal grants-in-aid. The long-term municipal
securities presently being sold each year are in the general mag-
nitude of $25 billion to $30 billion. These securities are now much
more important in relation to total securities being issued and
outstanding.
In recent years, the interest rates of municipal securities have
tended to increase faster than interest rates on long-term corporate
bonds. A knowledgeable estimate is that higher legal and account-
ing fees required by new disclosure requirements and potential
liabilities will not only make municipal financing more time con-
suming, resulting in uncertainty as to proceeds and interest costs,
but will also and more concretely triple or quadruple costs in a
typical bond financing. However, this is only one side of the ques-
tion. Any additional costs incurred as a result of greater disclosure
requirements may be more than offset in the long run by an
increase in investor confidence, which should result in lower in-
terest costs than would otherwise be available.
Finally, it is to be hoped that stiffer disclosure and accounting
requirements will discipline the management and financing prac-
tices and spending proclivities of local officials and lead to a public
scrutiny of financial commitments. This scrutiny, in turn, can save
local tax monies, avoid the cost in inflation of monetizing deficits of
state and local governments, and prevent increased federal taxa-
tion due to revenue sharing, bailouts, and the inevitably more
costly absorption of new functions by the Federal Government.
9 See, e.g., S. 2969, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 13A(a)(4), (b)(2)(G), (c), (f)(3) (1976).
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Authors' Note: As this Article went to print, the New York Court of Appeals held that the
Emergency Moratorium Act for the City of New York, discussed in note 20 supra, "violates the
State Constitution in denying faith and credit to the short-term anticipation notes of the
city." Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., No. 391, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. Ct.
App. Nov. 19, 1976). The court observed that "[t]he constitutional prescription of a pledge
of faith and credit is designed, among other things, to protect rights vulnerable in the event
of difficult economic circumstances." Id. at 6. This decision will, no doubt, profoundly affect
the marketplace and should restore, to some extent, investor confidence in municipal
securities.
The New York Regional Office of the SEC recently sent a questionnaire to members of
the underwriting syndicates which have distributed New York City notes and bonds. The
questionnaire is an important indication of SEC concern about the requirements of due
diligence. It asks the extent to which the broker used or relied on its own independent
research; on studies distributed by the managing underwriters; on information made avail-
able by the city in its statements, reports, and budgets; and on reports about the city by state
officials, rating services, and the press. It then asks the extent to which the broker relied on
the legally binding character of the city's obligations, its access to real property to pay the
notes, relevant provisions of the state constitution, and the status of debt service as a lien on
the city's revenues. The brokers are asked whether they understood that the managing
underwriter, prior to forming the selling syndicate, had analyzed the city's creditworthiness
and fiscal soundness, the sufficiency of its revenues to meet its maturing obligations, and its
deficits and budget gaps. The questions continue: What did you know about the investiga-
tions the managing underwriter actually made prior to deciding to underwrite the bonds?
Were there any consultations with outside technical experts such as accountants or municipal
securities analysts? Who in the broker's organization verified the figures made available by
the city? What was your understanding as to the managing underwriter's obligations, e.g., to
verify the city's figures and bring to the buyer's attention any negative aspects about the
bonds? Was the managing underwriter's decision to underwrite the bonds accepted as an
express or implied approval of the creditworthiness of the city's fiscal position and its bonds?
The questionnaire then asks for the broker's understanding of the role or duties of bond
counsel and whether, prior to rendering its approving opinion, counsel verified or investi-
gated the accuracy and completeness of the figures and textual information presented by the
city. Examining the effect of the city's Notices of Sale and Reports, the SEC inquires whether
the brokers expected that any material changes in the city's accounting practices and policies;
any developments materially affecting the city's financial condition; any overestimates of
revenues from prior years from the federal or state governments or from real estate taxes;
any renewals or rollovers of notes and the reasons therefor; or any budget gaps, budget
deficits, cash deficits, or deficit financing would have been disclosed in these publications. It
then asks for instructions given to salesmen regarding the types of statements or representa-
tions permissible or impermissible in selling the bonds, the degree of risk believed to be
involved in the bonds, the risks salesmen were instructed to relate to their customers, and
what steps were taken to determine that the bonds were suitable to the needs of particular
customers. The brokers are then asked to indicate whether, at the time they sold the bonds,
they perceived the city's financial condition and accounting practices as excellent, good, fair,
or poor. The questionnaire then inquires whether they were aware of several adverse
observations which the state comptroller, in his audits, made about the city's financial
condition and practices.
In this questionnaire, the SEC appears to be applying corporate securities' standards to
a financial activity which has, for generations, relied solely on the full faith and credit of
governmental units, constitutional commitments that municipal bondholders get first call on
the city's revenues, and the exemption of bond income from taxation.
